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e Middle East represents a vital, yet problematic, region for the  
as it seeks to promote a more stable international order. e effort to 
achieve greater political stability in the Middle East has largely occupied 
a priority position in  foreign policy as it has been formulated since 
the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, over the past fifteen years, 
 security management efforts in the region have met with little 
success, while the Middle East’s security circumstances continue to 
deteriorate. Following the large-scale  military withdrawals that 
began in Iraq in  and Afghanistan in , this chapter will 
examine the place of the Middle East within the redesigned  foreign 
policy that is emerging under the “rebalance”. It will address two main 
research questions: what are the prime challenges facing  security 
management efforts in the Middle East, and what options exist for the 
 to promote greater stability in the region? 
Analysis will specifically focus on the perpetually problematic 
American alliance with Saudi Arabia. In recent years this alliance 
has become a crucially important part of a  strategy that aims 
to manage security in the Middle East. e effort to prevent wider 
nuclear proliferation due to increased tensions in the region is outlined 
as a critical security challenge for the hegemonic  specifically and 
international security more generally. is chapter will be divided 
into four main sections: section one will examine the  foreign 
policy transition in the Middle East, from the “maximalist” approach 
attempted under George W. Bush to the more “minimalist” forms of 
engagement that are outlined under the “rebalance”; section two will 
analyze the often problematic underpinnings of the -Saudi alliance; 
section three will examine the consequences for  foreign policy 
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that are born of the regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
as it continues against the backdrop of the threat of wider nuclear 
proliferation; and section four analyses the options the  has at its 
disposal in its efforts to coax and coerce Saudi Arabia away from any 
possible nuclear aspirations it might harbor. 
 “    ”        
     
It is no surprise that the shift in  foreign policy focus that was 
signaled during Barack Obama’s two presidential terms has received 
a lot of international attention. e core of this change is the apparent 
initiative to fundamentally reorder  foreign policy preferences. 
During the Cold War, the  strategic calculus regarded Western Europe 
as being of the utmost importance, followed by the Middle East and 
East Asia respectively. As the Middle East is a key supplier of energy 
for the  economy, as well as a problematic source of international 
terrorism and the location of states that are willing to frustrate  
interests, such as Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the region began 
to demand the majority of  strategic attention as the s drifted 
into the s, but the large-scale  military withdrawals from Iraq 
that began in  and Afghanistan in  appear to show that the 
pendulum of America’s foreign policy focus has again swung in the 
direction of changed regional focus. Under the Obama administration, 
industrialized East Asia has been strongly underlined as an emerging 
region that will be of foremost importance for future  security 
strategy. is has been spurred on by China’s potential to emerge as 
America’s chief geopolitical rival, together with significant economic 
progression in many other parts of the wider Far East. 
Early in the Obama presidency, this change in  foreign policy 
focus was introduced as the “pivot to Asia”. e term “pivot” quickly 
became diplomatically cumbersome as it fostered the impression that 
this change would lead to core allies residing in other regions receiving 
a considerable reduction in  security provision. Some people, such 
as John Mearsheimer, have argued that the term “pivot” has accurately 
captured the change of direction that is underway in  foreign 
policy: for Mearsheimer, in order to “pivot to Asia” Washington would 
naturally have to “pivot away” from other regions that it perceives 
to be of comparatively less importance, namely the Middle East 
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and Europe.¹ Accurate or not, however,  foreign policy vocabulary 
sought to lessen such impressions and “pivot” was subsequently 
exchanged for the more diplomatically prudent term “rebalance”. 
Diplomatic masking aside, while East Asia now appears to be firmly in 
the ascendency these changes still pose questions for the two regions 
in the awkward position of still being considered important but seeing 
their stock as a  priority go into decline. Questions concerning  
security management in the Middle East are especially pertinent in 
this regard. As the Middle East is by far the most politically volatile 
among the three regions of core strategic importance for the , how 
must Washington strive to improve security in a region that it will now 
probably devote less foreign policy resources and strategic attention to? 
It has been the view of some analysts that a reduction in  foreign 
policy attention towards the Middle East might well constitute a 
positive development for the region’s security as well as the national 
security of the  itself.  foreign policy in the Middle East is now 
formulated against the downstream of the failed American efforts to 
stabilize and democratize the region between  and  that 
took place during the presidency of George W. Bush. is was an era in 
which the  pursued an extremely ambitious, “maximalist” foreign 
policy line. Long at the heart of the debate on America’s role in the 
world has been the issue of whether  interests can be best served 
through either a “maximalist” or “minimalist” foreign policy, and 
Jonathan Monten has provided a succinct overview of this “minimalist” 
– “maximalist” spectrum. ose who advocate isolationism can be 
positioned at the “minimalist” extreme. Isolationists stress that 
the only prudent way for the  to positively influence others in 
the international system is to lead by example, by demonstrating 
virtue in its domestic affairs while avoiding intervention. is logic 
frames “the little city on the hill” analogy. By contrast, those at the 
“maximalist” extreme argue that the  should intervene actively with 
an almost missionary zeal in order to spread American values, which 
are perceived as holding universal benefits. -based liberal values are 
seen by those who subscribe to this position as promulgating peace, 
freedom and economic prosperity.²
 Comments of J.J. Mearsheimer cited in S. Kay, ‘Indecision on Syria and Europe may 
undermine America’s Asia pivot’, War on the Rocks,  July , http://warontherocks.
com///indecision-on-syria-and-europe-may-undermine-americas-asia-pivot/, 
accessed  January . 
 J. Monten, ‘*e roots of the Bush doctrine: power, nationalism, and democracy promotion 
in U.S. strategy’, International Security, vol. , no. , pp. -.
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Following the  September  terrorist attacks,  foreign policy 
fell heavily under “maximalist” influences. Strategic direction was 
formulated predominantly by a group of influential neoconservative 
policy staff and intellectuals that sought to widen the scope of 
America’s national security interest.³ is widening has been argued 
to have been inspired by “offensive liberalism”, a normative ideology 
that strongly justifies the use of military force in order to achieve what 
are perceived as morally desirable ends. is included the overthrow 
of regimes that were believed to be denying their populations basic 
human rights and other liberal freedoms.⁴ 
is guiding ideology behind George W. Bush’s foreign policy 
appeared to dovetail satisfactorily with the logic of liberal democratic 
peace and thus with wider  strategic desires, particularly in the case 
of the Middle East. e region is home to Israel, Washington’s most 
politically important ally, and also a source of the petroleum supplies 
that are crucial for the  economy. By forcefully promoting regime 
change in the Middle East, the Bush administration believed that  
actions could ultimately reestablish the region’s political foundations 
to align with liberal democratic peace. e  would assist the political 
and economic recovery of the nations concerned in such a way that 
anti-American terrorist networks and “rogue states” would diminish, 
the  would be observed favorably within the region, Israel’s national 
security would be reinforced and the security of oil supplies would 
be enhanced.⁵
Observing regional security in the Middle East from a  
standpoint, it can be seen that this vision was not realized. Instead, 
American actions have led to a number of chronic setbacks both for the 
 itself and for the region’s security. As early as , Linda Bilmes 
and Joseph Stigliz calculated that the -led war in Iraq after  
alone had created a  trillion loss for the  treasury.⁶ From a strategic 
perspective, instead of winning the democratic peace, an excessive 
 use of military force left a trail of anarchy and extreme political 
 For elaboration on this, see M.C. Williams, ‘What is the national interest? 
*e neoconservative challenge in  theory’, European Journal of International Relations, 
vol. , no., , pp. -. 
 B. Miller, ‘Explaining changes in  grand strategy: /, the rise of offensive liberalism, and 
the war in Iraq’, Security Studies, vol. , no. , , pp. -.
 For connections between George W. Bush’s foreign policy and democratic peace theory, 
see J. Snyder, ‘One world, many theories’, Foreign Policy, no. , , p. . 
 J. E. Stiglitz and L. J. Bilmes, ‘*e true cost of the Iraq War:  trillion and beyond’, 
!e Washington Post,  September , http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article////.html, accessed  January . 
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violence in its wake. Ironically, this increases the risk of “blow-back” 
terrorism against  targets or those of its regional allies. Saddam’s 
overthrow in Iraq quickly led to a three-way civil war between Sunni 
and Shia Muslims and Kurdish separatists, and volatility in post-
invasion Iraq facilitated a networking hub for foreign jihadists and 
Al-Qaeda affiliates. is allowed the dispersal of terror tactics among 
anti-American terrorist groups.⁷ Finally, together with civil war in 
Syria, state fragility in Iraq played a central role in the rise of the 
Islamic State after . 
Following the often destructive consequences of its recent foreign 
policy in the Middle East, the  currently finds itself in a very 
challenging position concerning its future strategy in the region. e 
strategy that aimed to pacify the Middle East through a mix of military 
force and an aggressive promotion of liberal values is now obsolete, but 
at a time when its main foreign policy focus emphasizes East Asia, the 
Middle East continues to present a number of acute security problems 
of both regional and international significance. Hence, the  must 
retain a strong secondary focus on the region. As the failures of George 
W. Bush’s “maximalist” foreign policy design began to become clear 
as his second presidential term approached in , many from both 
the realist and liberal sides of the foreign policy debate began to offer 
alternative approaches for  strategic engagement. 
Falling into this category was the idea of “smart power”, a term first 
coined by liberal thinker Joseph Nye, which argued that America should 
wield lighter forms of a combination of both “hard” and “soft” power 
than neoconservatives were advocating. For Nye, while not retreating 
into isolation, the  could better achieve its national security goals 
and incur lower costs if it projected power through a mix of coercion 
and attraction.⁸ On the realist side, both “offshore balancing” and 
“selective engagement” have been two of the most popular foreign 
policy alternatives that have been put forward for the  since the 
end of the Cold War. Seeing “offshore balancing” as a strategy that 
would help the  secure its core interests in Europe, the Middle East 
and East Asia while avoiding the folly associated with a “maximalist” 
foreign policy, Christopher Layne has advocated that the  should 
only station a light military presence in each region, but have larger 
 P. Bergen and A. Reynolds, ‘Blowback revisited: today’s insurgents in Iraq are tomorrow’s 
terrorists’, Foreign Affairs, vol.  no., , pp. -.
 J. S. Nye Jr., ‘Get smart: combining hard and soft power’, Foreign Affairs, vol.  no. , 
, pp. -.
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numbers of military units on stand-by elsewhere that can be mobilized 
should a  ally come under threat.⁹ Layne argues that the heavier and 
more visible  military presence that has in the past been stationed 
in the Middle East has increased the risk of terrorism by fostering anti-
American sentiment and also motivated Iran to seek a nuclear deterrent 
as a self-help defense measure.¹⁰
Agreeing with Layne on many virtues of “offshore balancing”, 
Robert Art nevertheless takes a contrasting view in proposing his 
“selective engagement” strategy to include the continuation of a 
considerable “on-site”  military presence in each region of core 
concern: East Asia, the Middle East and Europe.¹¹ Finally, Barry Posen 
has argued that previous  interventionist policies aiming to quell 
nationalist violence and engineer a liberal peace abroad have done 
more harm than good and have been counter-productive from a  
national security perspective. Posen argues that a more cost-effective 
 security strategy would involve greater leverage of its “command 
of the global commons”¹², making its military superiority over 
international airspace, the high seas and outer space count in order 
to coerce its enemies into line.¹³ 
While Nye’s concept of “smart power” and the various realist 
alternatives hold considerable merit, a number of blind spots can 
also be found concerning issues of critical current importance for  
foreign policy decision-making. Firstly, while most realist alternatives 
underline the frequently made point that East Asia, the Middle East 
and Europe are the three general regions that the  should prioritize, 
they do not provide a precise answer as to exactly where the  should 
“selectively engage”. Secondly, they do not outline precisely which 
security issues are most pressing for the , and thus which issues 
 C. Layne, ‘From preponderance to offshore balancing: America’s future grand strategy’, 
International Security, vol. , no., , pp.-.
 C. Layne, ‘America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore 
balancing has arrived’, Review of International Studies, vol. , no. ,  pp. -.
 R. J. Art, ‘Selective engagement in the era of austerity’, in R. Fontaine and K. M. Lord, Eds, 
America’s path: grand strategy for the next administration, Center for A New American 
Security, Washington D.C., , pp. -. And R. J. Art, ‘Geopolitics updated: the strategy 
of selective engagement’, International Security, vol.  no. , -, pp. -.
 For analysis of  military supremacy in these areas see, B. R. Posen, ‘Command of the 
commons: the military foundation of U.S. hegemony’, International Security, vol. , no. , 
, pp. -.
 B.R. Posen, ‘Stability and change in  grand strategy’, Orbis, vol.  no., , pp. 
-, see also B. R. Posen, Restraint: a new foundation for  grand strategy, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, , . 
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Washington should prioritize as part of any scaled-down “selective 
engagement” strategy. 
On the first point, drawing on the case of the -Saudi alliance, this 
chapter will illustrate that perseverance in  alliance management 
can benefit the wider regional security, even if managing problematic 
allies can be an arduously difficult responsibility for Washington. e 
contemporary alliance theory literature does not perhaps take this 
aspect sufficiently into account and focuses on how states subordinated 
to the  might align in a unipolar international system. For instance, 
Stephen Walt presents the conventional understanding that states 
subordinated to  power have three main options: to either balance 
against the , to bandwagon with the , or to stay neutral. Walt 
also argues that the end of the Cold War allowed the  “greater 
freedom of action” as the Soviet Union had disappeared as a strategic 
counter-weight.¹⁴ While these observations are correct, the picture is 
incomplete regarding some other intricate challenges that are often 
encountered in formulating  alliance policy. Despite its hegemonic 
status, the  position regarding global security affairs is sometimes 
heavily dependent on the behavior of its subordinate allies. 
It has been argued that Washington uses its peacetime alliance 
management options to both monitor and restrain the behavior of allies 
that have been problematic within the context of wider regional security 
circumstances.¹⁵ As a past example, Turkish and Greek accession 
to  during the Cold War served to mute their otherwise tense 
regional rivalry as both knew that aggression against the other might 
risk the withdrawal of crucial security privileges they received through 
their alliance with the . Reassurance provided from Washington can 
prevent a problematic ally seeking other security options that might 
otherwise upset the wider regional security order and thus risk regional 
instability.  efforts to provide stability through its alliances often 
reduces its “freedom of action”. Moreover, while “entrapment” is 
often conceived as a fear experienced by the subordinate states within 
an alliance, the  can also encounter “entrapment” in its relations 
with a problematic ally, should the regional balance be so delicate that 
retaining the alliance exists as one of the few options to stop the wider 
security situation deteriorating further.¹⁶ 
 S. M. Walt, ‘Alliances in a unipolar world’, World Politics, vol. , no. , , pp. -. 
 For general elaboration, see P. A. Weitsman, ‘Intimate enemies: the politics of peacetime 
alliances’, Security Studies, vol. , no. , , pp. -. 
 G. Snyder, ‘*e security dilemma in alliance politics’, World Politics, vol. , no. , , 
p. .
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On the second point, the first-order threat of wider nuclear 
proliferation still lingers in the Middle East along with the second-
order potential for greater regional volatility as the region’s main 
rivals posture against the backdrop of a possible nuclear option. Even 
a utilitarian  approach to “selective engagement” in the Middle East 
would advocate the use of American strategic assets in the region as 
a means of curtailing these specific dangers. Discussion surrounding 
possible  efforts to prevent wider nuclear proliferation feeds into 
the debate on whether the spread of nuclear weapons can promote 
either stability or volatility. rough added deterrence, Kenneth 
Waltz has stressed that the wider acquisition of nuclear weapons can 
promote greater systemic stability. is claim is based on the logic 
that the emergence of nuclear-armed rivals will raise the stakes to a 
level of extreme caution where each side will refrain from attempting 
even a conventional attack.¹⁷ It is under these assumptions that Waltz 
advocated Iranian nuclear weapons acquisition.¹⁸ 
However, this argument tends to forget what can occur during the 
time it takes for a state to develop nuclear weapons capabilities. e 
early stages of an arms race might foster the risk of armed conflict; 
the rival that possesses a nuclear weapon first may wish to retain its 
strategic advantage, and with its opponent’s deterrent still under 
development there would be no restrictions on the opportunity 
to wage a preventative war.¹⁹ is scenario is quite possible, so a 
reduction in regional tensions is unlikely. Moreover, arguing that 
nuclear proliferation is more likely to destabilize a region, Scott 
Sagan highlights a scenario where a nuclear-armed state may behave 
more aggressively by increasing is support for proxy wars in order to 
strategically weaken a regional rival. is is motivated by the idea that 
the possession of a nuclear deterrent reduces the possibility for nuclear, 
conventional or unconventional retaliation.²⁰ Indeed, contrary to the 
improbable threat assessment that an Iranian nuclear strike is likely 
should Tehran acquire the capability, more plausible Israeli security 
thinking echoes a similar perspective, wary that were Iran to possess 
 K. N. Waltz, ‘Nuclear myths and political realities’, American Political Science Review, 
vol. , no., , pp. -.
 K. N. Waltz, ‘Why Iran should get the bomb’, Foreign Affairs, vol. , no., , pp. -.
 C. L. Glaser, ‘*e causes and consequences of arms races’, !e Annual Review of Political 
Science, vol. , no. , , p. . 
 See the three-way debate on the Iranian nuclear program: S. D. Sagan, K. N. Waltz, 
and R. K. Betts, ‘A nuclear Iran: promoting stability or courting disaster?’, Journal of 
International Affairs, vol. , no. , , pp. -. 
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nuclear weapons it would become more zealous in its support for 
Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.²¹ Hence, despite 
arguments to the contrary, this chapter will adhere to the assumption 
that attempts to change the existing regional nuclear status quo are 
often likely to have a destabilizing effect. us, with the -Saudi 
alliance at its heart, this chapter will explain how a number of issues 
threatening the strategic nuclear balance in the Middle East stand to 
provide many intricate diplomatic challenges for the  as it applies 
its “rebalanced” foreign policy to the region.
     :        
As well as assisting other strategic objectives for the  in the Middle 
East, the security assurances that Washington has long provided 
to Saudi Arabia can be perceived as part of a foreign policy that is 
designed to limit the risks of further nuclear proliferation in the 
region. In contrast to  security management in both East Asia and 
Europe, where American security guarantees have largely worked 
well to support stability, Kathleen McInnis argues that  extended 
deterrence has long suffered from a “credibility gap” in the Middle East. 
is has emerged from the often politically irritable relations that the 
 has had with some of its main allies in the region. Should Turkey, 
Egypt or Saudi Arabia perceive  security assurances as unreliable 
to meet the possible threat of a nuclear Iran, these states may then 
decide to seek their own nuclear arsenals. Washington would thus 
encounter the threat of wider nuclear proliferation as well as a deep 
crisis in the Middle East.²² 
e -Saudi alliance has not been formed on a cohesive basis of 
shared values or deep mutual trust but is rather, as Gawdat Bahgat 
highlights, a minimal and highly pragmatic bargain. Saudi Arabia 
has long maintained a stable supply of oil for the  economy. 
Riyadh has subsequently used the influence gained from this to 
ensure that petroleum prices remain at profitable levels on the 
world market, while Washington seeks to guarantee Saudi national 
 S. Pifer, R. C. Bush, V. Felbab-Brown, M. S. Indyk, M. O’Hanlon and K. M. Pollack, ‘ nuclear 
and extended deterrence: considerations and challenges’, Brookings Institution Arms 
Control Series, Paper , , p. . 
 K. J. McInnis, ‘Extended deterrence: *e U.S. credibility gap in the Middle East, 
!e Washington Quarterly, vol. , no., pp. -.
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security against external threats.²³ Although doubts concerning Saudi 
Arabia’s nuclear intentions are occasionally voiced, Bahgat outlines 
that the Saudi leadership has long denied that it harbors any nuclear 
ambitions. Speculation on the nuclear option for Saudi Arabia can 
gain some anecdotal plausibility when one observes the country’s 
arduous strategic circumstances combined with its regime’s financial 
affluence. A Saudi nuclear program might not have to progress through 
the same lengthy research and development process that other past 
nuclear aspirants have had to establish, rather it might simply be able 
to purchase a nuclear weapons infrastructure at relatively short-notice. 
Conversely, a long-standing argument against the possibility of Saudi 
acquisition of nuclear weapons has been based on the logic that the 
reliable security guarantees it receives through its alliance with the  
eliminates the incentive for Riyadh to develop a nuclear deterrent.²⁴ 
In order to assess the strength of the latter prognosis, the durability 
of the pragmatic bargain forming the core of the security partnership 
between the  and Saudi Arabia needs to be reconsidered in light of the 
deteriorating security circumstances in the Middle East. e question 
of Saudi nuclear weapons acquisition tangibly emerged following the 
 September  attacks on the . Many of the attackers possessed 
Saudi citizenship, and social inequality is a prominent trend in Saudi 
society. Large sections of the population who are not privileged 
with connections to the Saudi ruling regime are often denied social 
opportunities and can instead come under the influence of clerics 
preaching extreme Wahhabi ideologies.²⁵ Saudi society’s emergence 
as a supplier of radicalized personnel for Islamic terrorist organizations 
caused considerable unease in  policy circles, and Riyadh feared that 
the crucial security assistance that it had traditionally received from 
the  was on the verge of diminishing as a consequence. 
e strategic turmoil in the Middle East caused by the  military 
intervention in Iraq in  did little to reduce Saudi fears. Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq – a strategic counter-weight serving to constrain 
Iran’s regional power – had fallen. While its alleged nuclear arsenal 
is officially undeclared, many reputable sources refer to Israel holding 
 G. Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, University Press of Florida, 
Gainesville, , p. . 
 Ibid, p.-. 
 For further explanation of social inequality in Saudi society, see I. Bremmer, ‘*e Saudi 
paradox’, World Policy Journal, vol. , no. , , pp. -.
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nuclear weapons.²⁶ Israel’s nuclear preponderance among the Middle 
East’s littoral states, coupled with Iran’s newfound freedom of action, 
meant that Riyadh began to nervously contemplate the plausibility of 
two bitter regional rivals eventually posing a nuclear threat.²⁷ With 
the number of serious threats multiplying as the s progressed, 
the Saudi leadership were further prompted to consider whether their 
ties with Washington were durable enough to indefinitely protect 
the country’s security. Saudi thinking in this regard was suppressed 
temporarily as it became a crucial ally, both during the  “war on 
terror” after  and during the  military intervention in Iraq in 
, although the latter was not seen as wholly benefitting Riyadh’s 
strategic position. 
     ,    ,      
Doubts concerning the condition of the -Saudi alliance have 
continued to fester under the surface. ese have in part been 
heightened as an indirect result of  and Israeli actions or policy 
in the wider Middle East over the last fifteen years, since . e 
response of Iran to  foreign policy in the region during this time has 
had many problematic repercussions for Saudi Arabia, among other 
countries. Often provoking arduous complications for  security 
management attempts, the densely entangled patterns of enmity that 
define the Middle East’s security order often mean that efforts related 
to resolving one particular dispute can simultaneously have negative 
repercussions for conflicts elsewhere in the region. Riyadh has long 
looked on with anxiety at Iran’s extremely hostile rivalry with Israel. 
Since the early s, successive Israeli governments have sought to 
communicate to Washington their grave assessment of the threat that 
Iran’s regional power strategy holds for the Middle East. Tel Aviv has 
repeatedly called for  support through harsh coercive sanctions and 
even possible pre-emptive military options to curtail Iran’s nuclear 
program.²⁸ Paradoxically, Israel’s alarmist approach has been argued 
 See Z. Maoz, ‘*e mixed blessing of Israel’s nuclear policy’, International Security, vol. , 
no. , , pp. -. 
 E. MacAskill and I. Traynor, ‘Saudis consider nuclear bomb’, !e Guardian,  September 
, http://www.theguardian.com/world//sep//nuclear.saudiarabia, accessed 
 January . 
 F. Rezaei and R. A. Cohen, ‘Iran’s nuclear program and the Israeli-Iranian rivalry in the post 
revolutionary era’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. , no. , ,p. .
 AFTER REBALANCE
by some to have counter-productively strengthened Iran’s zeal to 
realize its nuclear ambitions.²⁹ Together with Israeli policy, George W. 
Bush’s  foreign policy in the Middle East was argued by some to have 
exacerbated regional difficulties.  actions in the region had the effect 
of unintentionally galvanizing hardliners within the Iranian regime. 
Between the  September  attacks and the  military 
intervention in Iraq in , Washington widened its security policy 
focus beyond the threats of transnational terrorist organizations to 
include “rogue states”. e Bush administration declared Iran part of 
the “axis of evil” together with Iraq, North Korea and Syria. ese were 
the prime states outlined by the White House as posing a menacing 
threat to the  and its allies. Following the  military intervention 
which overthrew Iraq’s ruling Ba’ath dictatorship in , the Iranian 
government perceived itself firmly within the American and Israeli 
lines of fire. Iran was clearly signaled as a threatening state that 
ought to be tackled next by the . rough its actions against Iraq, 
Washington had already displayed its intent to overthrow unfriendly 
regimes with overwhelming military force. In this context, perceiving 
the need to safeguard its sovereignty as imperative, Iran is argued to 
have accelerated its efforts to attain a nuclear deterrent.³⁰
While receiving marginal attention as the tense stand-off between 
the  and Israel on one side and Iran on the other has escalated over 
the past decade, the questions surrounding Iran’s nuclear program 
that have emerged from this dispute would nevertheless hold serious 
implications for Saudi Arabia’s security policy. roughout the Iranian 
nuclear crisis, Riyadh has called for the halting of Iran’s nuclear 
program. Based on action-reaction security dilemma logic, Iran’s post-
 nuclear ambitions perhaps increased the risk of Saudi Arabia 
being lured into a dangerous nuclear arms race. Interestingly, the 
 agreement negotiated to stop the possibility of Iranian nuclear 
acquisition does not appear to have allayed Saudi fears. After arduous 
negotiations, in return for the lifting of Western sanctions, Iran agreed 
with the world’s major powers to eliminate any possibility of its nuclear 
energy industry producing weapons-grade uranium. 
Ironically, this outcome has triggered renewed fears of Iran’s 
regional resurgence in Saudi Arabia and cast doubts on the sustainability 
 L. Horovitz and R. Popp, ‘A nuclear-free Middle East – just not in the cards’, 
!e International Spectator, vol. , no. , , p.. 
 R. Takeyh, ‘Iran’s nuclear calculations’, World Policy Journal, vol. , no. , , 
pp. -. 
PROMOTING STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST?
of the -Saudi alliance. Armed conflict in the Middle East has long 
been fuelled by a bitter ideological divide between the Sunni and 
Shia Islamic sects. e fall of Saddam’s Iraq in  left Saudi Arabia 
strategically weakened as a remaining Sunni power. Iran holds the 
region’s largest Shia society. With actions structured in line with 
religious affiliation, Saudi Arabia and Iran have previously vehemently 
supported opposing sides in many bitter civil conflicts around the 
Middle East. For both Riyadh and Tehran, these conflicts have emerged 
as strategic proxy wars where both have sought to inflict damage on 
the interests of other, and both have recently supplied weapons and 
financing to opposing belligerents fighting in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and 
Yemen. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has pointed to recent unprecedented 
aggression from Iran and accused it of overstepping previous “red lines” 
by supporting political and militant opposition forces among the Shia 
minority concentrated in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich eastern province and 
Shia opposition groups in neighboring Bahrain.³¹ 
While on the surface the Saudi leadership have demonstrated a 
reluctant acceptance of the  Iranian nuclear deal, the agreement 
provokes its two principal fears: firstly, one strand of Saudi thinking 
believes that relief from Western sanctions will rejuvenate Iran’s 
economy and thus present Tehran with greater financial resources 
to support its proxies battling Saudi-backed adversaries in the 
region³²; and secondly as the agreement is binding for a ten-year 
period, suspicions exist that Iran might use this time to establish 
nuclear weapons technologies outwith its territory in a clandestine 
manner, possibly in partnership with North Korea.³³ e amplified 
sense of threat that arises from these perceptions could prompt the 
Saudi leadership to revisit the debate on whether their alliance with 
Washington provides enough security vis-à-vis the alternative of a 
nuclear deterrent. 
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      : 
    
While doubts linger in Riyadh, many views have emerged from 
Washington that see Saudi Arabia as an increasingly problematic state 
within the  alliance network. Chief among the critics has been the 
foreign policy team at the  Institute, a prominent libertarian 
think-tank that advocates the virtues of a “minimalist”  foreign 
policy. Proposing that the  should disqualify Saudi Arabia as an ally, 
 analyst Ted Galen Carpenter has pointed to the behavior of Saudi 
Arabia’s ruling regime, which has committed many grievous human 
rights abuses and follows a reckless policy of financing Sunni-aligned 
transnational terrorist organizations, which in turn emerge to threaten 
 security interests. Saudi Arabia is alleged to have supported the 
Sunni rebel groups in Iraq and Syria that would later form the Islamic 
State.³⁴ Dissatisfaction towards Saudi behavior in the region has also 
been displayed by some high-level  politicians. October  saw 
Vice-President Joe Biden chastise Riyadh by saying: 
“Our allies in the region were our largest problem in 
Syria… …the Saudis, the Emirates, etcetera. What were 
they doing?… …ey poured hundreds of millions of 
dollars and tens of tons of weapons into anyone who 
would fight against Assad – except that the people 
who were being supplied, [they] were al-Nusra, and 
al-Qaeda, and the extremist elements of jihadis who 
were coming from other parts of the world”.³⁵ 
Realizing the acute difficulties such comments could create for  
foreign policy in the Middle East, Biden later apologized. However, 
illustrative of the pragmatic  alliance management approach 
 T. Galen Carpenter, ‘With “friends” like Saudi Arabia, the United States doesn’t need 
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towards Saudi Arabia’s often duplicitous Middle East policy, one  
analyst described Biden’s mistake as “political” rather than “factual”. ³⁶ 
Preventing the Saudi attainment of nuclear weapons appears to be 
at the heart of this  pragmatism. Mirroring concerns that foresee 
that Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon would strengthen Tehran’s 
resolve to support Shia extremist groups, some have argued that a 
Saudi foreign policy bolstered by nuclear weapons capabilities would 
risk galvanizing Riyadh’s efforts to support Sunni insurgents operating 
in conflict zones throughout the globe. is would further frustrate 
 counter-terrorism policy.³⁷ For reasons such as this, despite 
the acutely problematic contradictions in Saudi policy, it has been 
outlined that Washington must strive to retain Saudi Arabia firmly 
within its alliance network. To ensure this, Gene Gerzhoy advocates 
projecting  influence towards Riyadh through a mix of both coercion 
and reassurances. On one hand, Washington can threaten to lead 
embargos on conventional arms exports to Saudi Arabia. Replacing 
and maintaining Western-standard military equipment would be 
almost impossible were Washington’s cooperation cut off. is would 
drastically weaken Saudi military potential, leaving it increasingly 
vulnerable to regional security threats. On the other hand, in return 
for greater Saudi discipline in curbing its support for extremist militias, 
consistent actions demonstrating its commitment to nuclear non-
proliferation, and acceptance of contemporary  policy on Iran, 
Washington is able to offer many territorial defense benefits, possibly 
including sanctioning sophisticated military technology and improving 
intelligence sharing.³⁸ 
However, focusing on the latter, some evidence from past 
inconsistent  policy in dealing with delicate nuclear security 
situations perhaps weakens Washington’s ability to provide credible 
reassurances. Firstly, among other security matters, Russia’s 
illegal annexation of Crimea in March  raised questions about 
nuclear security order because Ukraine agreed at the  Budapest 
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Memorandum, to transfer the portion of the Soviet nuclear arsenal on 
its territory to Russia in exchange for political assurances from a group 
of powers led by the  that guaranteed Ukraine’s territorial integrity. 
e , among others, was ultimately unable to enforce this guarantee. 
is perhaps damages Washington’s credibility should it wish to offer 
or renew similar assurances in exchange for a de-escalation of nuclear 
tensions in the future.³⁹ Secondly, a general theme of George W. Bush’s 
 foreign policy between  and  was the separation of 
states into “good” and “evil” categories. Paradoxically, while firmly 
emphasizing the grave dangers arising from the nuclear ambitions of 
 adversaries, the Bush administration was simultaneously lenient 
towards “good” states that either already possessed a nuclear arsenal 
or held nuclear aspirations, if these states were  allies or important 
strategic partners in the “war on terror”. is category included 
nuclear weapon-states that were not party to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons () such as India, Pakistan and 
Israel. Moreover, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were grouped as 
“good” potential aspirants.⁴⁰ 
During the Cold War, Israel was able to conceal its development 
of nuclear weapons capabilities from the  through a clandestine 
program. Yet, due to Israel’s important status in relation to both  
domestic politics and  security strategy, Washington found itself 
having to accept Tel Aviv’s nuclear acquisition rather than imposing 
sanctions. Saudi Arabia falls lower down the  alliance hierarchy 
compared to Israel, but this past American tendency indicates 
possible acceptance rather than coercion for allies of high strategic 
importance who ultimately achieve nuclear weapon-state status. 
From this perspective, experience perhaps demonstrates to Riyadh 
that the risks might be lower than expected for a hedging strategy 
that would include pursuing a clandestine nuclear program, possibly 
in partnership with Pakistan, while simultaneously seeking to salvage 
its alliance with the .⁴¹ 
However, weighing up a contra perspective, Saudi Arabia might 
after all only have a marginal opportunity to undertake a clandestine 
nuclear program. e large  military presence located in the Persian 
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Gulf, including  bases located in Saudi Arabia itself as well as 
neighboring Qatar and Kuwait, means that Washington holds both the 
regional intelligence and military coercion capacities to ensure that any 
Saudi effort to develop a clandestine nuclear program will be difficult 
to both conceal and implement. Pursuit of the nuclear option would 
carry a perilous degree of strategic risk for the Saudi regime.⁴² While 
this on-site presence aids  containment of nuclear proliferation 
in the Middle East, the possibility that Washington may have to rely 
on its military capabilities to coerce Saudi Arabia away from nuclear 
aspirations illustrates just how chronically problematic the  alliance 
with Saudi Arabia is. While strategic circumstances dictate that both 
will continue to be shackled with this unhappy alliance, it is difficult 
to foresee an improvement in -Saudi relations. 
ese security policy problems coincide with a time of increased 
economic strain between the two states. e  “oil-shale revolution” 
has reduced both the  and global demand for Saudi Arabia’s 
petroleum products and thus triggered serious problems for the Saudi 
economy.⁴³ is has the potential to increase Saudi insecurity and thus 
foster animosity in its relations with the , which is likely to create 
further difficulties for  alliance management efforts that seek to limit 
the possibilities of a Saudi nuclear program as well as curtail Saudi 
Arabia’s proxy support for extremist groups.
 
Considering the security problems of both regional and international 
significance that find their source in the Middle East, it would not be 
wise for Washington to substantially downgrade its strategic focus 
on the region as it formulates its “rebalanced” foreign policy. e  
promotion of stability in the Middle East can still be conducted in 
a far more utilitarian manner compared to the overly “maximalist” 
approach attempted under George W. Bush. In this regard, much will 
hinge on the highly problematic  alliance with Saudi Arabia, and 
maintaining this alliance will prove a politically treacherous task for 
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American leaders on an almost perpetual basis. e Saudi regime’s 
abysmal human rights record alone means that the preservation of the 
alliance will continue to attract criticism from many commentators 
in the . Considered together with Riyadh’s regular support for 
many extremist Sunni insurgencies that in turn threaten  security 
interests, this would indicate a grim outlook for the health of the 
-Saudi alliance. Despite this, it appears that the “lesser evil” for 
the  will be to choose to continue to maintain its security ties with 
Riyadh, as a termination of this arrangement comes with the danger 
of pushing Saudi Arabia towards attaining a nuclear deterrent of its 
own, and this kind of development could well trigger a wider nuclear 
arms race in the Middle East. e Saudi acquisition of nuclear weapons 
would further inflame its bitter rivalry with Iran and thus increase the 
risk of chronic regional destabilization. 
From Saudi Arabia’s point of view, Riyadh is often dissatisfied with 
 actions. Having called for international action against Iran’s nuclear 
program for more than a decade, the  nuclear deal between Tehran 
and the world’s major powers to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions ironically 
provoked renewed apprehension in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia fears that the 
reduction of sanctions on Iran will revitalize its economy and thus 
provide Tehran with greater resources to support Shia insurgencies 
against the Saudi-backed Sunni proxies that violently clash throughout 
many of the Middle East’s conflict zones. e  initiative to facilitate 
the nuclear deal with Iran probably fostered further doubts in Riyadh 
concerning the value of the security assurances it receives from 
Washington, and a declining  reliance on Saudi-supplied oil as a 
consequence of the American “oil-shale revolution” will do little to 
ease these doubts. As a Saudi rejection of these assurances in favor of its 
own nuclear deterrent would mark an almost irreversible blow for the 
 security strategy in the Middle East, the  might eventually have 
no option but to dissuade its ally through coercive diplomacy. us, 
rather than an overly “minimalist” form of “offshore balancing”,  
difficulties with Saudi Arabia spell out the strategic necessity to retain a 
substantial “on-site” military presence in the Middle East with the aim 
of guarding against wider nuclear proliferation, among other threats. 
